Written by J. T. Gibson, Company A, 78th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry

It required more that a quarter of a century to enable the American people to reach any adequate idea of the importance of the Chickamauga Campaign in the War of the Rebellion. It has, at last come to be regarded as second in importance to not other campaign in our Civil War. It seems strange now thats its pivotal importance was not recognized by military men. The military leaders of the South and the President of the Southern Confederacy regarded it as a very important point, but, at the same time, they considered it a kind of Gibralter and did not fear its capture. In order to give our readers an intelligent view of the part taken in this campaign by the 78th Pennsylvania, it will be necessary for us to devote considerable space to a description of the movements of different parts of the Army. It will be necessary, too, to give some description of Chattanooga in its relation to Chickamauga battle field.

Chattanooga, as is well known, is situated on the southeastern plateau of the Tennessee River just where Chickamauga Creek flows into the Tennessee River, at the base of Lookout Mountain. Any attempt to take it by direct assault from the opposite side of the river would have been reckoned madness. Between it and Rosecrans' Army lying at Tullahoma, Manchester, McMinnville, and Winchester, lay the plateau of the Cumberland Mountains, 2,200 feet high, the Sequatchee Valley and Sequatchee River and Walden's Ridge at 1,300 feet high. Had General Rosecrans succeeded in crossing these mountains directly in front of Chattanooga, it would have been impossible for him to have captured the place by direct attack so long as it was defended by a strong force of the enemy. It was necessary for him, therefore, to move either on the right or left flank of the enemy, so as to interfere with his communications and capture the town by siege. To move on the enemies right flank would have been to cross the Cumberland plateau, Walden's Ridge and the Tennessee River; while to move on the left flank of the enemy required the crossing, at a lower point, of the Cumberland plateau, the Tennessee River, Raccoon Mountains and Lookout Mountain, about 2,200 feet high. For General Rosecrans to do either of these seemed an impossibility so long as he was confronted by the Confederate Army occupying Chattanooga. Any attempt to capture Chattanooga at this time, seemed to the Confederates madness. General Bragg is reported as grumbling because other commanders were permitted to lead their armies into the field, where they had opportunities to distinguish themselves, while he was left to occupy an impregnable fortress. Jefferson Davis is represented as saying with regard to the suggestion that General Rosecrans might attempt to capture this stronghold,

"Let the fool beat his head against the granite rocks of Chattanooga; he will find it quite another thing from Duck River."

Had General Rosecrans been given as many men for this campaign, compared with the forces of General Bragg, as were given to General Grant and Sherman for the capture of Vicksburg, compared with Pemberton's army, his undertaking would have not seemed so tremendous; but while he knew that his army was larger and stronger than General Bragg's army when the campaign began, it still seemed to him absolutely necessary, in order to his success, that he should deceive General Bragg in regard to his movements and do the thing that Bragg least suspected. If he would attempt to flank, by moving on the left wing of the enemy, it would be necessary for him to lead General Bragg to believe that he was moving on the right; or if he moved on the right, he must lead General Bragg to expect an attack on the left. I think we shall see, in the progress of this sketch that he was most successful in his attempt to mislead the enemy until the campaign was far on the way.

The Commander of the Union Army wisely concluded to not attempt to cross the Cumberland Mountains, the Sequatchee Valley, Walden's Ridge and the Tennessee River above Chattanooga. We are confident, now, that if he had done so, his undertaking would have proved a failure. He did undertake, however, to lead the Confederate Commander to believe that this was his purpose, while he moved on the left flank of the enemy, crossing the Tennessee River at Bridgeport and Caperton's Ferry, and then crossing Lookout Mountain from twenty to fourty miles south of Chattanooga over into the Valley of the Chickamauga. In order to understand these movements it will be helpful to look at the map. You will see that the Tennessee River flows in a general southwesterly direction, while Lookout Mountain extends nearly directly north and south, so that, after crossing the Tennessee River, it was necessary to cross Raccoon and Lookout Mountain.

In the latter part of August the movements to secure Chattanooga began. General Crittenden left his camp at Manchester and Hillsboro, and crossing the Cumberland Mountains, occupied the Sequatchee Valley where he built extensive campfires and sought to convey the impression that General Rosecrans' whole army was moving in that direction. He then crossed Walden's Ridge and Wilder's Brigade appeared in the valley above Chattanooga, where they began building boats as though to cross the river at that point. The Confederate Commander made arrangements to meet the expected attacks, and we have convincing evidence that the Commander of the Union forces had succeeded in deluding him into the belief that the Union Army would cross the river above Chattanooga. In the meantime General McCook's corps and General Thomas' kept undercover as much as possible while they moved in the direction of Bridgeport and Caperton's Ferry on the Tennessee River below Chattanooga. A pontoon and trestle bridge was thrown across the Tennessee River at Bridgeport where a part of General Thomas' corps crossed. The boats for the pontoon bridge at Caperton's Ferry were brought with the train and were kept concealed while a road was cut for their transportion through the woods. About the 29th of August these fifty boats, each capable of carrying fifty men were brought out of the woods, carried rapidly across an open field, quickly launched and, being filled with men, were towed to the opposite side of the river. The Confederates pickets were driven away, the bridge rapidly constructed and General McCook's corps passed over it to the south side of the Tennessee River. As soon as these two corps had crossed the river, General Crittenden marched rapidly down the Sequatchee Valley to join them taking position on the left, and marching around the point of Lookout Mountain, he occupied Chattanooga.

By the 4th of September General Rosecran's entire army was south of the Tennessee River, and two corps were on their way across the Raccoon Mountains. On the 7th of September General Thomas began the ascent of Lookout Mountain, twenty-six miles south of Chattanooga, and on the same day General McCook started across Lookout Mountain about fourty miles south of Chattanooga. By the 8th General Thomas' corps was descending from Steven's and Fricks Gap and General McCook's corps was going down the mountain toward Alpine, while General Crittenden had pushed part of his command along the mountain trails until they were in sight of Chattanooga and discovered that General Bragg's Army had retreated from the town.

Affairs were now such in a condition as to completely mislead those who did not thoroughly understand the situation. Reports were sent abroad that General Bragg had retreated from Chattanooga and that our forces were entering the town. The impression prevailed that great victory had been gained, whereas it was the most critical time in the history of the campaign. Up to this point the Commander of the Confederate forces had been outgeneraled, having been deceived in regards to the real movements of General Rosecrans' Army. The strategy which had compelled the evacuation of Chattanooga was consumate. The forces, sent by General Rosecrans first to Pikeville and afterwards directly towards Chattanooga had effectually covered the movement of the Army towards General Bragg's communication with Gerogia, and at the same time was threatening his communications with Knoxville and the forces holding East Tennessee, so that General Buckner's Army had been withdrawn, and General Burnsides had been given easy possession of that region. The only effect of this strategy which had been infavorable to the ultimate success of General Rosecrans was the re-enforcement of General Bragg's Army by the addition of General Buckner's command. To gain possession of Chattanooga the strategy was perfect, but for immediate offensive operations south from that point it was radically defective.

When General Bragg evacuated Chattanooga and General Crittenden moved into the town, it would have been a comparatively easy matter for General Rosecrans to have recalled the corps of General Thomas and General McCook. Had they marched down Lookout Valley, and joined General Crittenden in Chattanooga, there would have been no Chickamauga battle at that time, and our Army would have had possession of the point for which the campaign had been planned.

On the morning of the 9th of September General Rosecrans sent the following message to General Thomas:

" A dispatch is just received from General Wagner, dated 8:30 p.m., yesterday, stating that Chattanooga is evacuated by the rebels, and he will occupy it in the morning. The general commanding desires you to call on him at once to consult in regard to arrangements for the pursuit."

It is evident from this dispatch that General Rosecrans at this time had no other thought than that he should pursue the enemy. He could have very easily have concentrated his whole army in Chattanooga without a battle, but he thought General Bragg was actually retreating, and was, therefore, misled by the strategy of the enemy. General Thomas urged General Rosecrans to abandon his scheme of pursuit and establish his army at Chattanooga and perfect his communications with Bridgeport and Nashville. General Thomas did not know how far General Bragg intended to retreat, but, independently of the enemies plans, he felt that what had been gained should first of all be made secure. He was opposed to any movement that might bring on a battle when the Army was not prepared to follow up a victory even if a victory were possible.

After his consultation with General Thomas, General Rosecrans issued the following order:

"The General commanding has ordered a general pursuit of the enemy by the whole army. General Crittenden has started to occupy Chattanooga and pursue the line of General Bragg's retreat. Our forces across the river from Chattanooga have been ordered to cross and join General Crittenden in the pursuit. General McCook had been ordered to move at once on Alpine and Summerville. The General commanding direct you to move your command as rapidly as possible to Lafayette and make every exertion to strike the enemy in flank, and, if possible, cut off his escape. Colonel Wilder's Brigade has been ordered to join you at Lafayette."

It is easy to see now that General Rosecrans made a serious mistake at this point. Nothing but the certainty that the enemy was retreating with scattered forces to some remote point could have warranted such a separation of the three corps of the Army of the Cumberland as resulted from obedience to this order. This was evidently the very thing that General Bragg hoped for. The mere occupation of Chattanooga for the time being, was nothing in itself unless the Army of the Cumberland could be concentrated there so as to defend it from attack. What had been accomplished up to this point was indeed a brilliant strategic success, so far as it had gone, but it came very near being the prelude to the destruction of General Rosecrans' Army. Looking from the top of Lookout Mountain, we could see the dust rising, indicating the movements of large bodies of troops from eight to ten miles distant and concealed from us by Pigeon Mountains and other elevations. Every intelligent soldier in the Army of the Cumberland felt a profound anxiety. We knew something of the situation. With one corp on the neighborhood of Chattanooga, another corp twenty miles down the valley, another corp twenty-four miles farther down the valley, a good opportunity was afforded to the Confederate Commander to attack and destroy any one of the three before it could be joined by the other two. When we discovered that General Bragg had not really retreated, but that he had only withdrawn behind Pigeon Mountains to await re-enforcements, and that he was being re-enforced from Virginia, from Mobile, from Mississippi and from East Tennessee, anxiety deepened into depression.

This general description of the campaign up to this point will enable out readers to understand the part taken by the 78th Regiment. After the Tullahoma Campaign the Regiment remained in Camp Decherd from the 8th of July until the 16th of August, most of the time being devoted to regimental and drill brigade, with ordinary picket duties. On the 5th of August Captain Cummins, the very popular commander of Company A, started for home, having resigned on account of ill health. The members of his company greatly regretted the necessity for their Captain's resignation. He had won their confidence and their affection, but all felt that it was a matter of necessity.

On the 16th of August the Regiment left Camp Decherd at 11 a. m., and marched five miles in the direction of the mountain and bivouacked for the night. On the 17th we crossed Crow Creek and marched about six miles, again bivouacking for the night. On the 18th we marched sixteen miles. On the 19th we marched one mile, encamping in a large field in Crow Creek Valley, naming our camp Cave Springs. In our marches during the Tullahoma Campaign we had to contend with mud; in our marches from Decherd to Cave Springs the dust was suffocating. Cave Springs afforded every facility for a pleasant encampment, and the soldiers took advantage of it, making their camp look very beautiful, as well as comfortable. On the 1st of September we left our encampment at Cave Springs at six o'clock p.m., marched to the Tennessee River, crossed the pontoon bridge below Stevenson's and marched two or three miles farther south, bivouacked for the night, or part of it, for it was one o'clock in the morning of the second when we arrived. On the morning of the second we continued our march in an easterly direction until we came within two miles of Bridgeport. On the third of August the Regiment marched to the summit of Sand Mountain, also called Raccoon Mountain, and bivouacked for the night. On the 4th we descended the eastern slope of the mountain and halted for the night at a place called Brown Springs. On the 5th we marched about five miles and encamped at a place called Lookout Hills.

As may be seen by Colonel Blakeley's Official Report, on Raccoon Mountain we found a deep ravine which was impassable, where Company C of the Regiment began work at five o'clock in the evening and in ten hours built a bridge 160 feet long and 35 feet high over which the 14th corps passed in safety. Colonel Blakeley's Official Report also tells of this mill on Lookout Creek where there was a large supple of wheat and corn and rye, and how Captain Marlin superintended the grinding of this supply of grain together with other grain, gathered in from the neighborhood, and turned the products over to the Commissionary Department of the Army. The Regiment remained at this mill on the 6th and until the evening of the 7th when we were relieved, and at ten o'clock on the 8th, moved forward to Lookout Mountain. Finding the road blockaded with troops, we bivouacked for the night. On the 9th the Regiment crossed the mountain and bivouacked for the night in McLemore's Cove, Company A, spending the night on picket duty. As we rested on the top of the mountain on the 9th we knew that General Bragg had retreated from Chattanooga and that our troops had entered the town. As we looked across the Chickamauga Valley, we could not discern the movements of troops, but we could see dust rising in the distance and were risking conjectures as to General Bragg's purpose, though there seemed to be a general impression that he was about to fall back to Rome, Georgia.

On the 10th we marched out through McLemore's Cove in the direction of Dug Gap in Pigeon Mountain. When we had proceeded about two miles brisk skirmishing began, when the Regiment, deployed in close column, moved forward driving the skirmishers several miles. Finding the enemy in force in our front, we halted, moved a short distance to the left of the road, and bivouacked for the night. On the morning of the 11th we were called up at two o'clock, and took our position on a hill a short distance to the rear. Heavy skirmishing commenced early in the morning, the enemy pressing our flanks and front. We maintained our ground until about three o'clock, when we were forced to fall back in the direction of Lookout Mountain. We learned afterwards that during this afternoon we had been in reality been confronting the whole of General Bragg's Army, and, if we had not presented a bold front while falling back on our own corps, we would certainly have been captured. We resisted their advance to the utmost without bringing on a general engagement.

Personally I do not recollect the events of any particular days more vividly that I recollect what occured on the 10th and 11th of September in McLemore's Cove. The 10th was a beautiful September day and our movements through fields and woodlands along pleasant ravines, over brooks and ridges would ordinarily have been very enjoyable, but there seemed to be something oppressive in the atmosphere. General Thomas and the other officers, and while the officers did not tell the soldiers of their anxiety, there was a kind of language without words, so that the feeling of anxiety was very pervasive.

Having sketched the movements of the 78th Regiment up to the evening of the 11th of Septmenber, we turn again to study the movements of the whole Army.

The morning of the 10th of September found a large part of General Thomas' corps in Lookout Valley. The evening of the 10th found General Negley's division in front of Dug Gap of Pigeon Mountains. By the morning of the 11th of September General Baird's division had moved forward through McLemore's Cove to the support of General Negley's division and General Baird's division had withdrawn and were in line of battle in front of Steven's Gap in Lookout Mountain where they were supported by General Brannon's of the 14th corp. The 78th Pennsylvania had led the movement out to Dug Gap and were the rear guards in the retreat or withdrawal back to Steven's Gap.

During the 11th of September General Negley's division, supported by General Baird's division, confronted two corps of Confederate infantry. Hill's and Walker's, and a division of Confederate cavalry in the gaps of Pigeon Mountain. There seemed to be no good reason why the Confederate forces should not have attacked and destroyed these two divisions of the 14th corps on that day. It was fortunate for us that they did not make the attack promptly.

The night of the 11th found General Thomas' corps in front of Steven's Gap with General McCook's corps in Lookout Valley about twenty miles farther south. General Thomas's corps was at this time separated from each of the other two corps of our Army by a distance of twenty miles, while nearly the whole Confederate Army was in easy striking distance. General Bragg's report of this event shows that he was greatly disappointed in that he did not succeed in crushing these advance divisions, if not the whole of General Thomas' corps, that day.

By the evening of the 11th it became evident that General Rosecrans must make a desperate effort to concentrate his army in order to meet an attack from the enemy. There were strong indications that the Army of General Bragg was being re-enforced and that he would make every effort to bring on a battle before the three corps of the Army of the Cumberland could be concentrated. It was discovered, also, that General Cheatham, of the Confederate Army, had moved south of Lee and Gordon's Mill. With the twentieth and twenty-first corps of General Rosecrans' Army nearly fifty miles apart and the 14th corps so near the Confederate Army that an attack might be made at any time, the conditions of affairs was most critical. The statement of this fact, however, only gives a faint idea of the situation. General McCook on the right wing could not join General Thomas by passing directly down Chickamauga Valley because he would probably strike General Polk's corps of the Confederate Army at Dougherty's Gap, through which it was necessary for him to pass in order to reach General Thomas. The only way to him was to recross Lookout Mountain, march down Lookout Valley and cross Lookout Mountain again at the point where General Thomas had crossed, but this would require several days.

About midnight on the 12th of September General McCook was ordered to march to the assistance of General Thomas with all possible dispatch. He at once drew in his forces, recrossed Lookout Mountain, marched down Lookout Valley to Steven's Creek, where General Thomas had crossed and then crossed the mountain for the third time. This movement of General Cook required about four days and by the 17th of September he had joined his forces with those of General Thomas in front of Steven's Gap in McLemore's Cove. For these four days the 14th army corps had confronted an army of between 60,000 and 70,000 men. General Rosecrans' whole Army at this time did not number more that 50,000 men. If the Confederate Commander could have brought on a battle before the 17th, even at a disadvantage so far as position was concerned, he should have been able to crush and destroy the 14th army corps. General Bragg's reports of this event indicate that he blamed his subordinates for not promptly executing his commands, but seems at the same time to have maneuvered with the idea of placing his army between General Rosecran's Army and Chattanooga. However it is to be accounted for, he missed his opportunity, and subsequent events indicate that he did not quite understand the movements of General Rosecrans' Army.

It must be confessed, too, that General Rosecrans, up to the evening of the 11th, did not understand the movements of General Bragg's Army. On the 10th of September, in a dispatch to General Thomas. General Rosecrans, speaking of General Bragg, says:

"It is important to know whether he retreated on Rome or Cedar Bluffs, and he commands General Thomas to open direct communication with General McCook and take care to hurt the enemy as much as possible. "

General Bragg had at this time a choice of corps, as each corps of the Union Army in its isolation was exposed to attack, and it was not in the power of General Thomas, General Crittenden or General McCook to give aid to each other except in so far as each could hold the enemy to the offensive against himself.

It is interesting for us to know how the campaign looked from the Confederate side at this time, and we have the following dispatch from General Bragg, dated Lafayette, Georgia, September 10th, 12 p.m., addressed to Major General Hindman:

"Crittenden's corps is advancing on us from Chattanooga. A large force from the South has advanced within seven miles of this point. General Bragg orders you to attack and force your way through the enemy to this point at the earliest hour you can see him in the morning. Cleburne will attack in front the moment your guns are heard."

General Hindman had been joined by General Buckner's corps so that Buckner's, Polk's and Walker's and one division of Hill's corps and a cavalry force, under General Bragg in person, were included in the combination against the two advanced divisions of out 14th corps. It is evident, therefore, that by skillful maneuvers and gallant fighting, Negley's and Baird's divisions had drawn from the midst of three converging columns when they fell back towards Lookout Mountain in the evening of the 11th.

From the 13th to the 16th, while General McCook's corps was marching to join General Thomas' corps had been moving gradually out from Stevens's Gap in the direction of Lee and Gordon's Mill to be in readiness to connect in one direction with General Crittenden and in the other with General McCook. On the 17th of September General McCook moved down Chickamauga Creek toward Gordon's Mill and joined General Crittenden. This was the position of the Union forces on the evening of the 17th of September. On the 18th the enemy's cavalry crosses Chickamauga Creek at Alexander and at Reed's Bridges and drove our cavalry back into the Rossville Road. The nature of the ground rendered it very diffucuilt for either army to understand the position of the other, but it was evident to private soldiers, as well as to the general officers, that each Army was struggling for the possession of Chattanooga. General Rosecrans had succeeded in concentrating the three corps of his army along the ridges on the west side of Chickamauga Creek and was expecting an attack every moment and at almost every point. General Bragg's Army seemed also to be moving down the Chickamauga evidently with the intention of passing around the left flank of General Rosecrans' Army so as to secure the Layafette Road and Rossville Gap. By the evening of the 18th General Rosecrans' Army was in front of Lee and Gordon's Mill.

Colonel Blakeley, in his official report, gives a consise and definite account of the movements of the Regiment from the 10th to the 18th. Speaking of the moving of the Regiment at midnight, on the night of the 10th, he says:

"The movement of my Regiment, as well as that of the whole brigade, was so quiet executed that our own pickets did not know of it until morning."

Speaking of the time spent at the foot of Lookout Mountain after we had withdrawn from Dug Gap, he says:

"I lay at the foot of Lookout Mountain from the evening of the 11th to the morning of the 17th behind rudely constructed breastworks. On the 17th the march was resumed in a northeasterly direction. At evening I halted on the ground occupied by a portion of General Crittenden's corps, where I remained until the evening of the 18th, and then was moved eastward two miles and halted until mighnight, then countermarched one mile, deploying my Regiment as skirmishers with C and H Companies in reserve, moved south to the north bank of the Chickamauga."

The 78th Regiment spent from midnight of the 18th until dawn of the 19th in guarding two fords of the Chickamauga to prevent an attack on the flank of General McCooks's corps. while it was moving into position. In the morning after General McCook's corps had passed, the Regiment followed and rejoined its brigade north of Crawfish Springs.

By the morning of the 19th we all felt that another day could not pass without a terrific struggle. The armies were so close together that the battle might commence at any moment. All felt, too, that the interests at stake were, not only important, but vital to both contestants. Confederate leaders knew that the life of the Confederacy depended on their holding Chattanooga. General D. H. Hill, of the Confederate Army, writing of this battle in the Century Magazine, says:

"It seemed to me that the Elan of the Southern soldier was never seen after Chickamauga-that brilliant dash which had distinguished him on a hundred fields was gone forever. He was too intelligent not to know that the cutting in two of Georgia meant death to all his hopes. He fought stoutly to the last, but, after Chickamauga, with the sullenness of despair and without the enthusiasm of hope."

Intelligent Confederates believed that the loss of Chickmauga would seal the fate of the Southern Confederacy and hence their Army was expected to fight desperately. On the other hand, the Army of the Cumberland knew that it must either repulse the enemy or be utterly destroyed. It was evident to private soldiers, as well as to commanding officers, that it would be impossible to retreat either across Lookout Mountain or across the Tennessee River. These two considerations rendered the next two days the most important two days in the whole history of the War of the Rebellion. Looking backward forty years, we can hardly understand with what good cheer and hopeful courage the 78th Regiment stopped at the famous Crawfish Springs and discussed the beauty and excellence of this magnificent fountain while they rested for a little time and quenched their thirst.

Battle of September Nineteenth

We have spoken of the position of the 78th Regiment on the night of the 18th as it guarded the fords near Lee and Gordon's Mill, but, in order to understand the battle of the next day it will be necessary for us to tell of some of the changes that were made in the position of out Army during the night of the 18th of September.

Armies positions Friday, September 18, 1863.

On the evening of the 18th, General Bragg's Army was concentrated in the neighborhood of Lee and Gordon's Mill, south of Chickamauga Creek, while the three corps of the Union Army were in such a position as to be able to support each other in case of attack. General Bragg's plan of battle contemplated the crossing of the Chickamauga below Gordon's Mill and assailing the left wing of the Union Army so at to thrust his army between General Rosecrans' Army and Chattanooga. When this plan was made, General Crittenden's corps formed the left wing of the Union Army, but, during the night of the 18th, a great transformation took place which disconcerted General Bragg and compelled him to change his plans. Early on the evening of the 18th General Thomas' corps moved closer to General Crittenden's. But, instead of closing up on General Crittenden's right, as General Bragg supposed he was doing, this corps, with the exception of the part that guarded the ford on Chickamauga Creek, marched by the rear of General Crittenden's corps, took position on his left, with General Brannon on the Kelly farm on the extreme left. General McCook took position in the rear of General Negley and Crittenden. This inversion of the Union Army, undercover of the night, deceived General Bragg and enabled General Rosecrans to prepare for battle between General Bragg's Army and Chattanooga, and in front of the two most important passes into Chattanooga. This was a brilliant strategic move both in its plans and execution.

Armies positions on September 19, 1863.
7 a.m. to Noon

The early dawn of September 19th, 1863 gave promise of a bright, clear autumn day. The name Chickamauga means River of Death, but Nature gave no hint that morning as to the harvest Death would reap in the valley of Chickamauga on that and the following day. From that time onward the name seemed peculiarly appropriate, for, of the 120,000 young strong brave men under that morning, the grim harvester claimed between three to four thousand during the next two days, and nearly 25,000 other were included in the lists of wounded or missing.

About 9 o'clock in the morning, while General Bragg was preparing to attack General Crittenden's left, supposing it was the extreme left wing of our army, and was expecting to outflank General Crittenden, so as to get between General Rosecrans and Chattanooga, he heard with suprise General Thomas' attack in the vicinity of Reed's Bridge, two miles to his right, and three or four miles from where General Thomas had been on the evening of the eighteenth. This attack on General Bragg's right so alarmed and disconcerted him as to prevent his immediate attack on General Crittenden.

Armies positions on September 19, 1863.
Noon to Mid-Afternoon

This was the beginning of the great battle of Chickamauga. It was a suprise to both armies; for neither expected to meet the other in force at this point. As the sound indicated a furious battle, General Bragg sent re-enforcements from all points. His whole plan of the battle was completely changed and he found himself compelled to fight with his enemy between him and Chattanooga. By eleven o'clock the battle was raging fiercely. General Baird and Brannon of General Thomas' corps would have been driven from the field had not Johnson of McCook's corps come to their support. He was placed on General Baird's right; then came General Palmer from General Crittenden's corps, who saw that he was not likely to be attacked at Lee and Gordon's Mill. When Palmer's ammunition began to fail VanCleve came to his support, and, when he was driven back, Reynolds moved forward and was in turn overpowered. Then came Davis' division and drove the enemy for a time, but was compelled to give way when Wood's division appeared on the scene and again turned the tide of battle. As fast as the Union Line was extended to the left it was attacked by the Confederates who were well massed west of the Chickamauga. In six hours from the time General Bragg has ordered the attack on Crittenden at Lee and Gordon's Mill only a single brigade was posted there. The two armies seemed to an ordinary observer like great wheels rolling down the valley and coming in contact at only one point. The fighting was terrific. Every division of the Union Army was in line except the reserve under Granger, which was some five or six miles on the left, near Rossville. General Bragg was making desperate attempts to push his right between the Union left and Chattanooga, but was met and repulsed at every point.

Armies positions on September 19, 1863.
Mid-afternoon to Dark

By three o'clock the tide of the battle had swept down the valley so far that General Negley's division was not longer needed to guard the fords, and it was moved from its position near Crawfish Springs to the Widow Glenn's house. On this march down the Chickamauga Valley we saw a most magnificent battle scene--a panorama of war on a grand scale. The battle was raging fiercely in the forest along the Chickamauga; batteries of artillery and brigades of infantry were moving on double quick to the support of our forces on the battle lines. As we moved along the road leading to the Widow Glenn's house, from a ridge. overlooking the valley of the Chickamauga, we could see the smoke of battle rising above the trees almost shutting out our view of the forest, while the roar of artillery with the rattle of musketry was deafening. We could see part of General McCook's corps, numbering perhaps ten to twelve thousand men, including artillery, moving at double quick time down into the woods, out of which were pouring thousands of wounded soldiers and stragglers. It was a sight never to be forgotten.

Colonel Blakeley, in his official report, speaking of the movements of the 78th Regiment from the fords near Lee and Gordon's Mill says:

"In moving north to the Brigade we passed a part of the line where the division of General Jefferson C. Davis was engaged in a sanguinary conflict with the enemy. We passed under the rebel fire while the roar of the battle and the sight of the wounded, bleeding and mangled I feared might make even the heroes of Stone River quail. Some were cheerful and others quiet and meditative, but determination was pictured on each brow which satisfied me that there would be no flinching."

About half past four o'clock General Negley's division, having reached the Widow Glenn's house, was ordered forward to meet the enemy who seemed to be breaking through our center. As we marched down and took our position in the edge of the woods, where now stands the monument of the 78th Pennsylvania Regiment, we seemed to be entering the very center of the fiercest conflict, and we fully expected to bear the brunt of the battle that evening. We need hardly say that it is a most serious and sublime moment in any man's life when he takes his position in line of battle and momentarily expects an attack. Speaking of the Regiment at this time, Colonel Blakely says:

"We attained our position under a raking fire but found that we could not successfully return fire, as the enemy was in the woods on high ground on our front, and, being without sufficient support to charge, I ordered the men to lie down until needed."

Had we been attacked by the enemy at this time we would certainly have been crushed, for we did not completely fill the gap in our lines and were unsupported on either the right of left. Instead of attacking our front, however, as we expected, the enemy seemed to fall back. For a little time there was comparative quiet all along the line, and by half past five o'clock we began to think the battle might be over for the day. We thought it possible, however, that the enemy was only making preparations for another desperate charge. Our doubts were soon solved. General Cleburne and Walker had been moving to the extreme Confederate right, and about six o'clock, with a line about one mile in length, made a most furious assault on General Johnson's division of General McCook's corps which resulted in the most terrific battle of the day. In this battle the 77th Pennsylvania took a very active part and lost very heavily. Among the wounded, and left on the field to be captured by the enemy, was Captain William A. Robinson of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, afterwards Lieut. Colonel, and Brevet Brig Gen. Robinson. The Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel and a very large section of the 77th Regiment were captured.

An officer of the 77th Regiment, speaking of this battle, says:

"The fight on the 19th of September in which the 77th was engaged was about one-half mile in front of the Brotherton house, in the woods. We had moved from the Kelly field a little to the left of Snodgrass house in the forenoon. We struck the enemy soon after leaving the Kelly house, driving then some distance, when we were checked. We held this ground until six o'clock p.m. when the enemy moved on our line in two columns, Bushrod Johnson's brigade in the front, followed closely by General Smith's brigade. When very near to us, Johnson's brigade moved by the right and left flanks on both sides of us and to out rear. It was very dark an the fighting was desperate. General Smith and two of his staff were killed, having broken right into the 77th Regiment's lines. We held the ground for a time, but were greatly outnumbered by the enemy. The darkness, the killed and wounded in our midst, the flashes of light, the woods on fire, the desperate fighting, the mixture of Confederates with our own men, made it a night long to remember. Some of the 77th Regiment escaped, but the majority were finally taken prisioners, including all the staff and most of the line officers."

The 78th Regiment did not have any active part in this battle, but my comrades in the Regiment will agree with me that in all our experiences we never heard more terrific firing than we heard during the half hour that evening. The roar of small arms sounded like a very heavy rain falling on the roof, and we could hardly distinguish when a dozen pieces of artillery added their roar to that of the musketry. As night came on, and we were not attacked, we spent out time throwing up small breast works of stone and other material that might suffice to turn a Confederate bullet. Traces of these rude fortifications are still to be seen on this part of the battlefield. In his official report, General Rosecrans, speaking of the night of the 19th, says:

The roar of the battle hushed in the darkness of night; and our troops, weary with the night of marching and a day of fighting, having everywhere maintained their position, developed the enemy and gained the positions commanding the Rossville and McFarland's Gap's, rested on their arms."

Company A was on the skirmish line that night, about one hundred yards in front of the line of battle, until midnight when it was relieved by Company B. It was a cold night for September. It was one of the most terrible nights in all our army experience. The coming on of the night had brought a cessation of the battle, but it was a most terrific, undecided struggle, and we fully expected that it would begin again at day break in the morning. The men on our skirmish lines were not more that ten paces apart, and we believed that we were not more than one to two hundred yards from the skirmishers and advance line of the enemy. Between our lines and those of the enemy were many dead and many wounded, and we could hear the wounded crying for water, but were unable to give them any relief. Though there was some moonlight, in the dense wood it was quite dark, so that our skirmishers could not see each other. Once during the night one of our skirmishers had quietly advanced a few paces to make investigation. He had, indeed, moved so quietly that the men on either side of him had not been aware of his advance. When he returned to the line he made more noise and, being mistaken for the enemy, soon found himself pinned between two bayonets in such a way that he could not move without instant death. Explanation followed and he was set free.

No words can adequately describe our condition that night. The memories of what had taken place during the day, the immediate surroundings and the outlook of the morrow were terrible beyond description. When the little trifles of daily life sometimes threaten to murder sleep by bringing anxiety in regard to tommorow, I think of that night, and I go to sleep thanking the Lord that I am not on the battlefield of Chickamauga as I was on the 19th of September 1863.

Battle of September Twentieth

Sabbath morning, September 20th, was cool and clear with a heavy fog hanging over the valley of the Chickamauga. For several hours after daylight this fog prevented any decisive military movements, and there were but few indications of the terrible battle to be fought on that sacred day.

During the night both armies had improved their opportunities to perfect their lines and strengthen their weak points. General Bragg had received heavy re-enforcements and was prepared to attack with many brigades that had not yet been engaged in the battle. General Longstreet was place in command of the Confederate left wing while General Polk commanded the right wing. General Rosecrans had received no re-enforcements, and had scarcely a regiment that had not been engaged on the preceding day. The left wing of his army was slightly withdrawn from the ground on which it had fought on the 19th , and was placed in a strong position on the edge of the woods which skirted the Kelly farm. During the night the corp commanders were called together at the headquarters of the commanding General, and at this conference, General Thomas urged that the right center of the Army should be withdrawn from Missionary Ridge to the transverse hills to the right and rear of center. The Ridge and these hills commanded Dry Valley and much of the ground between that road and the one leading to Lafayette by Lee and Gordon's Mill. Had this been done our Army would have been better prepared for the battle of the 20th.

In the battle of the 20th General Bragg had fourty-two brigades, including two hundred and twelve regiments and fifty batteries of artillery. General Rosecrans had thirty-three brigades, including one hundred and fifty regiments and thirty-six batteries. His army was greatly outnumbered by that of the enemy, but he had the advantage of position because he was enabled to fight largely on the defensive. On Sabbath morning the Union line was about two and one-half miles long. The shortness of the line compared with the number of troops is adapted to suggest the terrific character of the conflict.

A glance at the map of the second day's battle will enable the reader to understand the description given hereafter. It will be seen that General Baird was on the extreme left of the Union Army; directly on his right was Johnson; then Palmer, then Reynolds, then Brannan, then Negley, and, on his right VanCleve, then Wilder, then Davis, and, on the extreme right Sheridan. On the extreme right of the Confederate was Breckinridge, and on his left Walker, then Cleburne, with Cheatham in reserve; on the left of Cleburne was Stewart, and on his left Johnson, with Law and Kershaw in reserve; on Johnson's left was Hindman, with Preston on the extreme left, facing Sheridan. A glace at the map will show, also that the Union left wing was outflanked by the Confederate right wing which extented to the Lafayette Road.

Armies positions on September 20, 1863.
Morning to 11:00 a.m.

As the morning wore on towards nine o'clock the soldiers began to ask each other whether there would really be a battle that day. It was well known that General Rosecrans was opposed to fighting a battle on the Sabbath and it was confidently believed that he would not make the attack; it seemed possible, therefore, that hostilities might not be renewed until Monday.

About nine o'clock the silence was broken and a fierce battle began on our extreme left. General Breckenridge with three brigades attacked Beatty's brigade of Baird's rear. The left brigade of Breckenridge's division, however, struck Baird's breastworks and was shattered, while their commander, General Helm, and two of his colonels were killed. As General Baird's brigade was compelled to fall back before superior forces, Stanley's brigade of Negley's division came to the rescue and turned the tide of battle for the present, completely repulsing Breckenridge's attack. Cleburne then made an attack but it was repulsed with great loss. It is said that our artillery in this battle did wonderful execution. The attacks of Breckenridge and Cleburne had hardly been repulsed when Walker moved forward, striking Palmer's left. For a time the whole Union left seemed to be in great peril, and it began to look as if the Confederate Army would succeed in establishing itself between the Union Army and Rossville Gap. The two brigades of Breckenridge's division burst out of the woods on the north side of the Kelly field, threw out a heavy skirmish force and struck the flank of Reynold's front. General Thomas, who had been carefully watching the progress of events, saw the danger and asked for re-enforcements, and Brannan's division was ordered to go to Thomas, but was prevented by an attack on his own front. He used wise discretion, however, remained on the line of battle, and in the meantime sent one brigade to the assistance of General Thomas. This brigade came into the open field in front of Breckenridge, charged the Confederate line, driving the two brigades of Breckenridge clear beyond the Union left wing, and then fell back to a point not far from the Kelly house.

In the meantime, one of Walker's brigades had secured a position on the line which Beatty had held, but a charge of General Grose's brigade drove the Confederates from this point, and the left of the Union Army was strengthened by placing Barnes of VanCleve's division on the left of Baird. This was the condition of affairs on the left wing of our army about twelve o'clock. There had been terrific fighting and General Bragg's Army had suffered such loss that the Union left wing was not attacked for several hours.

Armies positions on September 20, 1863.
11:00 a.m. to Mid-afternoon.

While this conflict was progressing on the left wing of our Army, General Negley was ordered to move from the Brotheron woods and take position on General Thomas' left. General Wood of General McCook's corps was to take Negley's place in the line. The request that General Negley's division should be sent to take position on the left of Baird was made by a message dated 6 a.m. of the 20th, and address to Major General Rosecrans, and read as follows:

"Since my return this morning I have found it necessary to concentrate my line more. My left does not now extend to the road that branches from McDonald's and Reed's bridge. I earnestly request that General Negley's division be placed on my left immediately, etc."

In response to this message General Rosecrans at 6:35 a.m., sent the following message to General McCook:

General Negley's division had been ordered to join General Thomas' left. The General commanding directs you to fill the space left vacant by his removal, if practicable. The enemy appears to be moving to our left."

We have quoted these orders as they are found in the official reports in order that our readers may fully inderstand what took place that morning. General Negley was to be relieved by General Woods before moving his troops to the left wing as requested by General Thomas. General Wood did not arrive promptly so that General Negley's division was still in its place at the right of Brotherton's at nine o'clock when there came urgent calls from General Thomas for General Negley to move to the left, and one brigade was sent. Our brigade remained in the Brotherton woods until about ten o'clock. There were no indications that we were about to be attacked, but there was a tremendous roar of battle on our left and some fighting on our right. About ten o'clock General Negley, supposing that Wood's division was ready to take its position, withdrew from Brotherton's woods and moved backward and eastward along the slope of the hill towards the Snodgrass House where our Regiment took position supporting the artillery. When we had moved back probably half a mile from the front and passed along the slope leading toward the Snodgrass House a desperate charge was made by the enemy at the very point we had left unprotected. Before General Wood had reached the place and before we had reached our position at the Snodgrass House, the Confederates were sweeping everything before them, and pouring through the gap in our line where we had withdrawn. and where a part of Brannan's division had been withdrawn to meet Breckenridge's charge on the left. Whether anyone was to blame for this unfortunate weaking of our line we can not say. General Wood, who was to have filled our place, was attacked in front just as orders came to relieve Negley, and being compelled to defend his own front, did not obey the order promptly. General Thomas knew that the left of the Army was both vulnerable and vital and had sent urgent calls for Negley's division. General Wood, no doubt felt that it would be very perilous to leave a position where he was attacked, but the delay in filling the place left vacant by the withdrawal of our Brigade came very near being fatal to the Army of the Cumberland.

It has been claimed that General Rosecrans errored in giving command at this time; that General Wood was ordered to close upon Palmer instead of being ordered to close on Brannan, that our division should not have been removed until Wood's division had relieved us. But it should be remembered, on the other hand, that General Thomas to protect his position without leaving a weak spot somewhere, and the Confederates pressing us at all points were sure to discover the weak spot. They did not break through, however, even at this point without meeting desperate resistance. We cannot show this better that by quoting General Stewart, who commanded the Confederate division that broke through our lines. He writes as follows:

For several hundred yards, both lines pressed on under the most terrific fire that it has ever been my fortune to witness. The enemy retired, and our men though mowed down at every step, rushed on at double quick, until at last the brigade on the right of Brown broke in confusion, exposing him to enfilading fire. He continued on, however, some fifty to seventy-five yards further, when two regiments on his right gave way in disorder, and retired to their original position. His center and left, however, followed by the gallant Clayton and the indomitable Bate, pressed on, passing the corn field in front of the burnt house, and to a distance of two hundred to three hundred yards beyond the Chattanooga Road, driving the enemy within his line of entrenchments, and passing a battery of four guns, which were afterwards taken possession of by a regiment from another division. Here new batteries being opened by the enemy on our front and flank, heavily supported by infantry, it became necessary to retire, the command reforming on the ground occupied before the advance."

From this description, we learn how the battle looked from the other side. It was a critical moment for the Union Army, and yet, in the language of another, " Not a single soldier left the line." Standing steadfast, they resisted, as General Stewart describes, and then were incited to still greater heroism by the greater achievements of their comrades under VanDerveer in their rear.

General Rosecrans, McCook, Negley, Sheridan and Crittenden have all been severly criticized for their actions at this critical time. That there were mistakes on the part of all of them, there is scarcely reasonable doubt. Looking at the events, however, in the light of subsequent history, and knowing just what was taking place on the left, and knowing the absolute necessity for resiting attacks on the left, we can only say they probably did not do the best thing, but they did what seemed wisest and best at the time, and it is not necessary to call hard names. Had General Stewart's command struck this point before the removal of the last brigade of General Negley's division, it seems quite probable that he would not have succeeded in breaking our line,but, on the other hand, it might have been impossible to resist the attack of the enemy on our left wing.

The result of this break in our lines cut off Sheridan with his two brigades from the army that was fighting under General Thomas; VanCleve's two brigades were thrown into great confusion, and the three divisons of General Crittenden, comprising his whole command, had been ordered in succession to General Thomas, and General Crittenden was left without any command. General Rosecrans, the commander of the Army, came near being cut off from the main body of the Army along with part of General McCook's corps. Sheridan had been blamed for not marching at this time by the most direct route to join General Thomas. Had he done so, he could have added from seven to ten thousand men to the fighting force in the terrible conflict of the afternoon. Generals Rosecrans, McCook and Crittenden all went to Chattanooga, but the courts of inquiry afterwards justified Rosecrans and Crittenden and excused McCook.

Six divisons of the Confederate Army under General Longstreet had taken part in this charge upon the Union center, sweeping its right wing off the field. There were Stewart, Bushrod Johnson, Preston, Hood, McLaws and Hindman. Eight brigades poured through the gap lefted by Wood and Hindman, finding no resistance on the left, moved to the right at assist Longstreet's center and right which had been checked by Brannan and Wood. This brought Longstreet's six divisions together in the vicinity of Horseshoe Ridge.

About 2 o'clock, General Longstreet ordered a general assult with these six divisions, and, to meet this assault, there were only Croxton's brigade and part of John Beatty's, Stanley's, the 21st Ohio of Sirwell's, and a few other regiments, making probably about 40,000 men. Against this small force without reserves, Longstreet sent forth his solid columns and it seems strange that he did not succeed in completely overwhelming them. Through some misunderstanding, General Negley had ordered artillery off the field that could have been used to great advantage at this time. To those who understood the situation, it looked as though there was little hope of General Thomas being able to hold is ground.

There never was a time in the history of any battle when it required a higher degree of courage to meet attack, and probably there never was a time when soldiers displayed more undaunted courage. There were stragglers in the rear, but there seemed to be no one in the front who was unwilling to do his whole duty.

Just at this point, when everything looked darkest, a column of soldiers appeared moving very rapidly across the fields from the direction of the McDonald house. The story of these soldiers had often been told, and there is no more marvelous story in the history of any great battle than that which accounted for the unexpected appearance of these two brigades from Steedman's division of Granger's reserve. Stationed four miles from Rossville, General Granger recognized the fact that he was more needed where General Thomas was fighting this desperate battle than where he was commanded to stay; without waiting for orders he marched at once to the field of conflict, and he arrives just at the moment when it seemed impossible to have saved the Union Army but for his coming. It would be hard indeed to convince anyone who believes in the God of battles, that there was not something peculiarly providential in this matter. It is an extraordinary thing for any subordinate commander to take upon himself the responsibilty of leaving a position that he had been appointed to defend and to come to another position where be believes that he is more needed. General Granger knew that General Rosecrans would be likely to send him an order to come, if he thought it wise that he should come; still his soldiery instinct was so wrought upon that he disobeyed orders to the saving of the Army. We feel confident, too, that the hand of an over-ruling Providence will be recognized by those who fought on the Union side. General Fullerton, the late lamented President of the Chickamauge National Park Commission, said to General Stewart one day, as we were overlooking the battlefield of Chickamauga from one of the high towers erected near the Snodgrass House,

"How can you explain the fact that General Longstreet, with his overwhelming forces and his repeated attacks, did not succeed in crushing the Union forces in his front?"

General Stewart said in reply,

"I know only one reason, and that is, the Lord did not intend that it should be so."

We believe that is the real explaination of the results in both cases. The God of battles was determining what should be the result of this fight that was to decide the fate of the Southern Confederacy.

General Steedman advanced in the line of battle and delieverd a volley at short range, charged the enemy's lines, drove them back on their batteries, pursued both infantry and artillery to a point beyond the Union left where Grose's command from the rear of Palmer's completed the work.

The coming of General Steedman inspired the whole Army with new courage. He brought not only fresh troops but a hundred thousand rounds of cartridges and a quanity of artillery ammunition that was of special value as the amminition had, through some mistake been ordered off the field. The battle raged fiercely, right, left and everywhere. General Longstreet organized several separate attacks and assaulted different points in rapid succession. It is said that he had ten brigades in front of Brannan and Steedman, while they had only four organized brigades and a few fragments from other brigades. About three o'clock preparations were made on the part of the Confederates' for a general attack on the left wing but it lacked the energy and fierceness of former attacks. The Confederate Army had suffered terribly in the earlier part of the day, and it would be difficult to say which army was the less able to attack the other. A few fresh troops on the side of the Union Army at this time would probably have swept the Confederate forces from the field; but both armies were completely exhausted and the battle, for the day at least, was ended. General Thomas's line was unbroken, while the Confederate Army had been repulsed at every point. But the ammunition of our army was exhausted, and a little before six o'clock General Thomas decided to withdraw and occupy the passes in his rear at McFarland's and Rossville Gaps which controlled the road to Chattanooga. His aim was to occupy those positions before they could be seized by the Confederate forces.

Had the battle been fought for the possession of Chickamauga battlefield instead of Chattanooga, it might have seemed a defeat for us to fall back to this point; but, when we take into consideration the fact that the possession of Chattanooga, and not of Chickamauga, was the great object of the campaign, it must be evident that it was, its final outcome, a great victory for the Union Army. Notwithstanding these facts that are now evident to every intelligent man, Charles A. Dana, who had been appointed by the President as Assistant Secretary of War, according to his own confession, telegraphed a cipher dispatch to the War Department at Washington, which read.

"Chickamauga is as fatal a name in our history as Bull Run."

He seemed utterly ignorant of the fact that, so long as there was possiblity of our army holding Chattanooga, it was a most important victory for the Union cause.

In this battle the 78th Pennsylvania lost probably as few men as any regiment on the field. Three times we seemed to be at the very center of the fiercest conflict, but some change in our orders in each case relieved us. At one time the 21st Ohio, of our brigade, was substituted for our Regiment, and they were cut to pieces while we were sent elsewhere. During the entire battle the Regiment moved with as much precision as on dress parade, and, so far as I know, every man did promptly his whole duty. As we marched to the rear in the dusk of the evening to take our new position, we had a few prisoners, and Colonol Blakeley, who was riding at the head of our column, turned to the prisoners and said.

"Whose men are you?" They said, "We're Longstreet's men." The Colonel said in reply, "I guess we all came near being Longstreet's men today."

Speaking of our Regiments movements on the 20th Colonel Blakely, in his official report says,

"Soon after the commencement of the battle of the 20th I discovered the enemy was massing his troops in the woods on my front, and, reporting this to the brigade commander, two pieces of artillery were sent to my aid and a breastwork of old logs thrown up by my Regiment. About 11 a.m. Our whole division moved to the left, leaving this line unoccupied. Our new position was on the foothills about one mile from the position we held in the morning. As we marched from our first to our second position, I saw the enemy break through the line we had held in the morning, and this enabled him to cut off the right wing of our Army, which produced the great disaster of the day. In our formation on the foothills, the 37th Indiana was on my left and the 21st Ohio on my right. I was moved foward to support Captain Bridges Chicago Battery, then in action on the crest of the hill near a small house used as a hospital. I deployed my regiment on the brow of the hill in front of and below the battery, the gunners firing over us."

The responsibility for the outcome of the battle of Chickamauga fell upon General Thomas, and he so distinguished himself as to be known ever afterwards as the "Rock of Chickamauga."

We do not undertake to pass judgement of General Rosecrans, McCook and Crittenden, the Commander of the Army and the commanders of the other two corps who went to Chattanooga on the 20th. That General Rosecrans failed to seize his opportunity that afternoon, there can be no doubt, but no man is omniscient. In his official report he tells something of the circimstances under which he went to Chattanooga, and the reasons for his actions. he says,

"At the moment of the repulse of Davis' division I was standing in the rear of his right waiting the completion of the close of McCook's corps to the left. Seeing confusion among VanCleve's troops and the distance Davis' men were falling back, and the tide of battle surging towards us, the urgency for Sheridan's troops to intervene became imminent and I hastened, in person, to the extreme right to direct Sheridan's movements on the flank of the advancing rebels. It was too late; the crowd of retreating troops rolled back and the enemy advanced. Giving the troops directions to rally behind the ridge west of the Dry Valley Road, I passed down it, accompanied by General Garfieled, Major McClintock and Major Bond of my staff and a few of the escort, under a shower of grape, canister and musketry for two ot three hundred yards and attempted to rejoin General Thomas and the troops sent to his support by passing to the rear of the broken position of our lines, but I found the routed troops far towards the left and, hearing the enemy's advancing musketry cheers, I became doubtful whether the left had held its ground, and started for Rossville. On consultation and further reflection, however, I determined to send General Garfield there while I went to Chattanooga to give orders for the security of the pontoon bridges at Battle Creek and Bridgeport, and to make preliminary dispositions either to forward ammunition and supplies, should we hold our ground, or to withdraw the troops in good position."

Had General Rosecrans joined General Thomas, the decisive battle of the afternoon of September 20 would have been fought under his immediate direction. General Thomas received no instructions from the Commanding General, and was uninformed of the disaster on the right until the oncoming left wing of General Bragg's Army revealed it. He was commanding a part of the Army of the Cumberland as though it were the whole Army in its conflict with the vast army that had been arrayed against it--an army superior in numbers and inspired by the hope of winning a decisive victory. No commanding officer was ever put in a more trying position than General Thomas occupied afternoon. He had only a section of the Army; he did not know the exact situation; he could not act as independently as he could have done had he been commander in chief; he had no supporting cavalry, and it may be safely said that no other general in our Army ever displayed greater ability in the crisis of a battle that was displayed by General George H. Thomas on the 20th of September at Chickamauga. That General Rosecrans regarded his Army as defeated and retreating is evident from his message, sent to General Garfield, dated September 20th, which reads as follows,

See General McCook and other general officers, ascertain the extent of disaster as nearly as you can and report. Tell General Granger to contest the enemies advance stubbornly, making them advance with caution. Should General Thomas be retiring in order tell him to resist the enemies advance and retire on Rossville tonight."

General Garfield, who received this dispatch, after seeing General Thomas, sent a dispatch to General Rosecrans dated five miles south of Rossville, 3:45 p.m., saying,
"General Thomas has Brannan's, Baird's, Reynold's. Wood's. Palmer's and Johnson's division here, still intact, after terrible fighting."

General Garfield goes on to show that General Thomas, instead of retreating, was heroically holding his ground, that the rebel ammunition was probably exhausted as well as that of our own Army, and he adds,

"If we can hold out an hour more it will be alright."

It is not necessary to say that General Thomas was the man for the hour, and that he saved the Army of the Cumberland on that battlefield.

The great battle of Chickamauga ended in the neighborhood of Snodgrass Hill about sundown, Sabbath evening, September 20th. The fierce and repeated attacks of the enemy had been repulsed and General Thomas held his central position, standing, immovable, "The Rock of Chickamauga," with his headquarters a little to the rear of Snodgrass Hill. About 5:30 p.pm. he had ordered the withdrawal of the lines from the Kelly field, and the general advance of General Bragg's right wing began about sunset, but was checked by the retiring Union troops. About eight p.m. Wood's and Brannan's divisions were withdrawn from Snodgrass hill, passing through McFarland's Gap to Rossville. The whole Army, with the exception of two divisions that had been sent to Chattanooga, was placed in position in Ross' Gap and on Missionary Ridge to the right and left of the gap and across the valley, the right wing extending to Lookout Mountain. The withdrawal of the Union Army was made in an orderly way, and the new position taken was held during the 21st. At midnight of the 21st, the Union Army retired to Chattanooga and occupied an extremely strong defensive position. It is somewhat doubtful whether the Confederates would have dared to attack the Union forces had they remained at Snodgrass Hill, though it seemed quite probable, as they had superior forces and had some troops that had not been actively engaged in battle.

In this way, on the 21st and 22nd of September, the great battle of Chickamauga gave place to the seige of Chattanooga. The Union Army had secured the position for which the whole campaign had been planned and for which the battle was fought, and the great question now was, would it be able to defend itself in that position?

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Observations Concering the Battle
It may not be amiss at this point to give the results of most careful investigations in regard to the relative strength of the two armies engaged in the battle, and their losses.

General Rosecrans crossed the Tennessee River with an effective forces of 60,000 men. Of this number, Wagner's brigade of more than 2,000 men held Chattanooga, while Post's brigade of Davis' division and three regiments of infantry and one battery of artillery were engaged in guarding supply trains; so that General Rosecrans' actual fighting force did not exceed 50,000 men.

General Bragg reported a week after the battle that he had 38,846 effective men and that he lost 18,000, which would make his whole strength at the battle 56,846. But, in a letter to General Lee to President Davis, dated December 14th, Lee says,

"If the report sent to me by General Cooper, since my return from Richmond, is correct, General Bragg had, on the 20th of August last, 51,101 effective men; General Buckner 16,118. He had received from General Johnson 9,000. His total force will, therefore be 76,219, as large as I can presume he can operate with."

This is independent of the local troops, which he reported as exceeding his expectations. In this estimate of General Lee, General Longstreet's forces, which General Bragg reported at 5,000, were not included, so that is we add the 5,000 to the figures furnished by General Lee, General Bragg had 81,219 men. But, more than this, General Johnson sent two brigades to General Bragg after he sent the 9,000 included in General Lee's estimate. Taking these figures as we find them, we may conclude the General Bragg did not have less than from 75,000 to 85,000 effective troops.

That there never was more desperate fighting in modern warfare than in this battle of Chickamauga is evident from the reports of the losses. General Rosecrans lost 16,179, including 4,744 missing, a large number of whom were either killed or wounded. General Bragg's losses as complied and estimated at the war records office were 17,804, making a total loss for each Army of about 25 percent of the troops actually engaged. General Longstreet's wing of the Confederate Army lost 44 percent, the larger part of these in an hour and a half on Sabbath afternoon. General Steadman's division, which met General Longstreet's assault, lost 49 percent in four hours, and these were all killed or wounded with one exception, while General Brannan's division lost 38 percent. General Vandeveer's brigade lost about 50 percent. On the Confederate side, Bushrod Johnson lost 44 percent, while Bate's brigade of Stewart's division lost 52 percent, brigade losses in Cheatham's division ranged from 35 to 50 percent and in Breckenridge's division from 35 to 43 percent. Wellington's losses in the battle of Waterloo fell far below the losses on either side in the battle of Chickamauga. At the great battle of Wagram, Napoleon lost only about 5 percent, while the percentage of losses at Wurzburg, at Zurich and Lodi sink into insignficance in comparison with our losses at Chickamauga. At Magenta and Solferino in 1859 the loss of both armies was less than 9 percent and at the great battle of Marengo and Austerlitz, Napoleon lost an average of less that 14 1/2 percent.

Assaults made by the Confederates in this battle were without parallel in the war; even Picket's charge at Gettysburg was only a single assault, while Longstreet's entire wing at Chickamauga made three general assaults on far more difficult ground than the slopes of Cemetery Hill. During the first day of battle neither army had any fortifications, but, on the second day, a part of the Union forces had constructed such barricades as could be readily made from the material at hand.

Colonel Blakeley's Official Report gives an excellent sketch of the movements of the Regiment from the time we supported Bridge's battery on Snodgrass Hill until we find ourselves in the line of battle in front of Chattanooga on the 22nd of September. We quote that sketch as follows"

"We defended the battery for a while, when it ceased firing and moved to the rear without indicating to me what its orders were. Soon after the battery left there was a lull in battle in our immediate neighborhood, but the firing on the left was heavy and our right irregular and passing to our rear. The position of the battery was an advanced one, and I did not connect with other troops by either flank, and in fact, after the battery left, I could see no Union troops anywhere except those of my own Regiment. I directed Major Bonnafon to take command until my return, and I rode back to where I had parted company with the 37th Indiana and the 21st Ohio. They were gone, and, so far as I could see, our whole line was gone and the right--McCook and Crittenden--all broken up. I returned to the Regiment and found the enemy closing in on it. Placing Major Bonnaffon in charge of our skirmishers to protect the movement, we marched to the rear, and they enemy, although in overwhelming numbers, did not follow but a short distance. About 800 to 1,000 paces from our position with the battery, we found General Negley alone. He posted us in a ravine or hollow between two foot hills, running down towards the Chickamauga, with orders to prevent the enemy at all hazards from breaking through a chasm or gap in the hill on the south of the ravine. I massed the Regiment in the ravine or hollow in front of the gap and Major Bonnaffon deployed two companies over the hill covering our front. He soon called for me, and I rode forward and found that our position was concealed from the enemy by underbrush; but, from the foot of the hill to the Chickamauga, a hundred rods or more, the land was clear and a column of Rebel troops at least, a division, were moving over the field westwardly across our front, evidently unaware of our presence. Major Bonnaffon was anxious to charge them. We might have driven them for the time being, but we would have been ultimately lost as we were without support. Returning to the Regiment I did not know what to do. We knew, as yet, nothing about the lines or the condition of the battle. We knew that the right was broken and that was all. To follow the sound of the battle on our left would probably lead us into the rear of the Rebel Army, where superior numbers would destroy us. I was about to go forward again to Major Bonnaffon to consider again the proposition to charge on the troops below us, when I noticed a mounted officer well up on the hill north of us. He approached us cautiously until he recognized us and then came down rapidly. He was one of General Thomas' Staff Officers. He asked why we were there and who put us there. I told him. He communicated the fact of the loss of the right wing. He stated that General Thomas had the only line unbroken, and he was fighting away for dear life a mile and a half northeast of us. The only possible way for us to get in was to strike for the Dry Valley Road. He gave me directions and ordered me to go, and left to find a way to his chief. We set out on the line indicated, Major Bonnaffon covering the movement with the skirmishers. The march being difficult and the danger imminent, I have no correct date of the time, or distance, but we found the Dry Valley Road, and it, and indeed the whole valley were filled with a struggling mass of stragglers, batteries, wagons, ambulances and troops of all arms, on a stampede for Chattanooga and pressed by the enemies cavalry. Dividing my command with Major Bonnaffon, they threw his skirmish line to the rear of the broken column, between it and the enemy, I moved rapidly down to near Rossville, and placing the Regiment across the valley we passed to Chattanooga all ambulances with wounded, all wagons and many wounded on foot, with the necessary assistance. We halted all unhurt troops and stragglers. We halted batteries and parts of batteries and ambulances not carrying the wounded. I was informed that by nightfall we had halted seven batteries and about five thousand men which were all reorganized that night and ready for action next morning. Colonel Sirwell, commanding the brigade, came to us at Rossville an hour later, when I reported to him. On Monday, the 21st, I occupied six different positions, the last of which was on and across Missionary Ridge on the left of your brigade and uniting with the right of General Beatty's Brigade. I was assigned to this position at 12 p.m., and directed to take orders from General Beatty...The night of the 21st I fell back with the general movements of the Army to Chattanooga."